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Abstract 
 
‘Governance’, as a concept, has been prevalent in the western academic literatures, 
and also is influencing the way we understand the Chinese public administration. In this 
article, I will first and foremost outline all types of ‘governance’ defined by different 
scholars, then focus on finding out which one is more applicable in china. The first part 
introduces three modes of governance critically, and creates a new model called 
‘governance with Chinese characteristics’ to understand Chinese public administration. 
The second part describes the Chinese model combining with case studies to illustrate 
the transformation and changes of Chinese public administration.  . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key words: Governance, Chinese public administration. 
  
 
 
 
 
X. Song 
I. Introduction 
It is reasonable to say that “governance” which was 
ignited a large debate on, when World Bank identified 
bad governance as a cause of economic crisis in many 
Third World countries, is a “buzzword”. Its 
theoretical roots are various: institutional economics, 
international relations, organizational studies, public 
administration and foucauldian-inspired theorists. 
(Gerry, 1998, p2) From “the minimal state” to 
“corporate governance, “good governance” to 
“self-organizating networks”, “new public 
management” to “public value management”, 
governance has been applied and operated in both 
developed countries and developing countries. 
Without any exception, the Chinese government has 
launched positively and actively a series of reforms in 
its governmental institutions, designed to promote 
economic development and social progress. This has 
been termed the “reform and open door” policy. (Chai, 
2004, p67). This essay is divided into two parts and 
primarily focuses on the significance and influence of 
governance to understanding of Chinese public 
administration, and endeavors to find out which kind 
of ‘governance’ is more viable to the current 
circumstance of china. The first part introduces three 
modes of governance critically, and creates a new 
model called ‘governance with Chinese 
characteristics’ to understand Chinese public 
administration. The second part describes the Chinese 
model combining with case studies to illustrate the 
transformation and changes of Chinese public 
administration 
 
II. What is governance? 
In public administration, Weberian principles of 
hierarchy, neutrality and career civil servants are 
traditional model of public administration, which 
assume that: 
‘modern public servants, according to Weber, 
should be career bureaucrats, recruited on the basis of 
ability rather than ascription’; ‘public moneys and 
equipment are divorced from the private property of 
the official’,……(Kjaer, 2004,p20) 
however, in 1980s this ideal-type model had been 
criticized for the reason that the hierarchical 
structures functioned in a rigid manner because of 
standard operating procedures and bureaucratic rules. 
The increasing debate and criticism of the traditional 
model of public administration led to a new wave of 
reforms during the 1980s and 1990s. Since then, the 
word of ‘governance’ began to become a popular 
word and debate about the changes that have taken 
place in the public sector. reforms and innovations in 
public sector can be defined in many ways, such as, 
NPM (New Public Management), good governance, 
and self-organizing networks. Flocks of literatures 
about governance have come out, in which the key 
and kernel discussion is more closely related to the 
role of government and the relationship between it 
and democracy, market, civil society, transnational 
organizations, corporate interests, and 
non-governmental organizations (NGO), and their 
standpoints are also distinct. The main discrepancies 
among them are: 
‘To what extent the role of government should 
be played, which kind of method would be better and 
efficient to enhance the capabilities of state 
adaptation to its external environment, and also 
denotes a conceptual or theoretical representation of 
co-ordination of social systems and, for the most part, 
the role of the state in that process’. (Jon Pierre, 2000, 
p3) 
However, a consensus can be reached, that is, 
governance is not identical with government. The role 
that government plays in governance is a variable and 
not a constant, and, as we will point out, government 
is only playing one of actors in governance. 
‘Governance as hierarchies’ (Pierre and peters, 
2000) 
Build on the criticism of the model of traditional 
public administration and ‘failure of the state’, 
politicians and scholars began to more or less 
disappoint the state, and tried to create new modes to 
grapple with ‘governance crisis’. Hence, it brings the 
new public management (NPM) method, which is 
more concerned with competition, markets, customers 
and outcomes. Advocators of NPM are conceiving 
that interventions and regulations to the economy by 
public sector are seen as a potential threat to 
efficiency because it distorts prices and incentives 
mechanisms, meanwhile, undermines the equal 
environment and conditions for fair competition. New 
public management was first introduced by the 
Thatcher government in Britain, but also in the 
United States under Reagan, and countries like 
Australia and New Zealand followed suit, and also. 
(Pierre and Peters, 2000) and some principles has 
become necessities as a condition for loans required 
by the international financial institutions. According 
to Pierre, the ‘new public management’ had two 
meanings: (Pierre, 2000) 
  ….. ‘Corporate management and marketization. 
Corporate management refers to introducing private 
sector management methods to the public sector 
through performance measures, managing by results, 
value for money, and closeness to the customer. 
Marketization refers to introducing incentive 
structures into public service provision through 
contracting-out, quasi-markets, and consumer 
choice.’……… 
the essence of the new public management is actually 
as managerialism. and it is also referred to as the 
three Es of Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness. 
(Rhodes, 1997a: 93) from this focus, it reflects the 
criticisms that there was too much ‘slack’ or waste as 
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the public institutions proceed the public affairs. 
Privatisation, agencification and devolution are three 
‘good ways’ to enhance the three Es from the 
perspective of advocates of the new public 
management. Privatisation simply means the selling 
or transferral of public sector enterprises to private 
ownership (Kjaer, 2004) in order to increase 
efficiency and reduce the costs to consumers and 
public sector expenditure. And another version of 
privatisation is the system of contracting out, which 
means that the state remains the buyer of the service, 
but the service is undertaken by a private agency. For 
instance, in Britain, Thatcher government was the 
forerunner, introducing far-reaching privatisation 
programmes that resulted in the privatisation of 
nationally owned coalmines, the postal services, the 
national railways and other large organizations. 
(Kjaer, 2004) agencification refers to the 
establishment of semi-autonomous agencies 
responsible for operational management. (Kjaer, 2004) 
And their underlying logic is that by separating 
agencies from political pressure, it can be run more 
efficiently. 
Although the new public management has been 
extolled by many its supporters, indeed there are 
some lessons and defects to be learnt from private 
management. According to Rhode’s account, there are 
four disadvantages for NPM: (Rhodes, 1997, p55-56) 
‘………Firstly, managerialism adopts an 
intra-organizational focus, say, 3Es, value for money, 
and measures of performance, and hardly pays 
attention to managing inter-organizational links. 
………Secondly, managerialism is obsessed with 
objectives, neglecting the maintenance of the 
relationship between public services department and 
private sector. 
………Thirdly, NPM focus on results, in an 
inter-organizational network, no one actor is 
responsible for an outcome; there may be no 
agreement on either the desired outcome or how to 
measure it; and the centre has no means of enforcing 
its preferences. 
………Fourthly, there is a contradiction between 
competition and steering at the heart of NPM.’ 
The application and emphasis on managerialism in 
the developed countries derived form a long-standing 
critique of how the public sector had worked, 
however, NPM in the developing countries to some 
extent is imposed on by the international 
organizations, such as, World Bank, IMF, without 
prudent considerations whether it could be adapted to 
another cultural, social and economic setting. 
Governance as self-organizing and 
inter-organizational networks (Rhodes, 1997, p53) 
Networks are the analytical heart of the notion of 
governance in the study of Public Administration. In 
network theory explanations given for the rise and 
existence of networks are as a rule of a functional 
interdependent nature: needs for resources, combating 
common environmental uncertainties, strategic 
considerations etc. (Jan, 2003,p104) and networks are 
also a common form of social coordination, and 
managing inter-organizational links is just as 
important for private sector management as for public 
sector. (Pierre, 2000,p61) Further networks are an 
alternative to, not a hybrid of markets and hierarchies 
and they span the boundaries of the public, private 
and voluntary sectors: (Rhodes, 1997, p52) 
…...If it is price competition that is the central 
co-ordinating mechanism of the market and 
administrative orders that of hierarchy, then it is trust 
and cooperation that centrally articulate 
networks……  
More important, this use of governance also suggests 
that networks are self-organizing. At its simplest, 
self-organizing means a network is autonomous and 
self-governing. (Pierre, 2000,p61) according to 
Pierre’s perspective: these networks can be 
characterized: 
   ‘First, by interdependence between organizations. 
Governance is broader than government, covering 
non-state actors. Changing the boundaries of the state 
meant that the boundaries between public, private, 
and voluntary sectors became shifting and opaque. 
   Second, there are continuing interactions between 
network members, caused by the need to exchange 
resources and negotiate shared purposes.  
   Third, these interactions are game-like, rooted in 
trust and regulated by rules of the game negotiated 
and agreed by network participants. 
   Finally, the networks have a significant degree of 
autonomy from the state’……(Pierre, 2000,p61) 
For example, in a UK analysis network development 
as a new governance mode is closely linked to ideas 
about ‘hollow-out of the state’, the argument being 
that, especially under the influence of New Public 
Management, the state has become ‘a collection of 
inter-organizational networks made up of 
governmental and societal actors with no sovereign 
actor able to steer or regulate.’ (Jan, 2003, p105) 
However, although there are lots of good points of 
Networks, we cannot lose sight of its defects. Such as, 
the obscurity of accountability. During the process of 
cooperation of all actors in networks, it is hard to 
discern who is accountable to whom for what. 
Secondly, supporters of ‘Networks’ would argue that 
trust and cooperation would be the basis of ‘good 
cooperation’, but there are almost many doubts about 
how can the institutions trust and cooperate with each 
other without any caution. According to the theory of 
‘rational choice’, the mainstream variant of rational 
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choice assumes that individuals all have the rational 
capacity, time and emotional detachment necessary to 
choose a best course of action, no matter how 
complex the choice, (Marsh and Stoker, 1988, p79) 
no one can promise that institutions in networks could 
cooperate by making full use of resources without 
any considerations for themselves, even cooperation 
is better than without collaboration. Thirdly, 
Hollowing-out erodes the capacity of the state to 
coordinate and plan. For example, with networks 
multiplying, the ability of the state to steer is 
decreasing.  
Overall, there can be hardly any doubt that the 
emergence of mixed networks of public and private 
actors is an important complement to or change of 
more traditional governance structures. 
Governance with Chinese characteristics 
It seems that there are a large number of meanings 
and models about ‘governance’, but by virtue of the 
Chinese special conditions no any single model could 
explain the phenomena emerged in china from the 
foundation of People’s Republic of China to now. 
Although elements of ‘governance’ outlined by me 
probably are not complete and full-covered, it 
incorporates significant factors of the other uses, most 
notably governance as hierarchies, as the New Public 
Management, as the self-organizing and networks. I 
conclude that elements listed below could help us to 
have a further understanding to Chinese public 
administration 
1, governance as a top-down structure, typical 
bureaucratically organizational forms, central 
government dominated by Communist Party is at the 
core of the state, and retain the ultimate leadership in 
the process of policy-making.  
2, proper-sized government, decreasing the numbers 
of governmental institutions, transferring state-owned 
enterprises to private forms, privatization, and input 
competition mechanism to public sector, and 
marketization. 
3, continuing interactions between network members, 
caused by the need to exchange resources and 
negotiate shared purposes. (Rhodes, 1997,p53) and 
the process of hollowing-out occurs at the centre of 
Chinese government. 
4, with the influence of globalization, global 
governance also influences the Chinese public 
administration, cooperation with international 
financial institutions, say, WTO, IMF, is becoming 
more popular than that of before ‘reform open’ policy. 
These key points clearly demonstrate the common 
ground between special Chinese governance and 
other definitions of ‘governance’, and would assist us 
to understand the transformation and current 
situations of Chinese governance. However, there is 
still one point I want to emphasize. In all these factors 
listed above, governance in the current Chinese 
situation is a hybrid of several models of 
‘governance’, and during the transformation process 
of Chinese public administration, it is essential to 
explore new ways to establish a new model of 
‘governance’ with Chinese characteristics. 
Presumably amazed the miracles of western 
economic progress, Chinese reformists groups began 
to apply ‘market mechanism’ into Chinese pubic 
sector so as to maintain the legitimacy of Chinese 
Communist Party and societal stability. But as early 
as in 1981, Deng XiaoPing warned: ‘without Party 
leadership there definitely will be nationwide disorder 
and China would fall apart.’ (Zheng, 1997,p5) 
moreover, organizing China has never been easy 
because of the sheer of size of its land and population. 
Therefore, centralized form of governance probably 
would be the best way for the development of China. 
But, one thing is certain, due to the advantages of 
market mechanism, networks, and cooperation with 
all sorts of organizations, Chinese central government 
is taking incremental reforming measures to 
contribute to Chinese economic growth, societal 
progress and improving living standard of Chinese 
citizens. 
In all, there are two points I am trying to clarify:  
First, making the most of good points of other models 
of ‘governance’ to enhance the continuing growth of 
Chinese economics and stability of Chinese society. 
Second, continued importance of the state and 
hierarchy for current Chinese developmental needs. 
 
III. Has the governance concept added to our 
understanding of Chinese public 
administration? 
The collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union forms the considerably 
contrast with china. Against this background, China 
seems to be doing very well: At an average of 9 
percent per year over the past sixteen years, (Zheng, 
1997,p3) the Chinese economy was the fastest 
growing in the world; market reform had been 
deepening, despite or perhaps because of the tragedy 
in Tiananmen Square in 1989; foreign investments 
poured in and Chinese products rushed out to all over 
the world. And China has experienced profound and 
historic social change due to a process of incremental 
reform that has transformed the country from a 
command to a market socialist economy. (Chai, 2004,) 
and why Chinese economic development increases so 
quickly since the ‘Reform and Open Door’ policy? 
Can china keep the continuous growth of economics? 
The concepts of ‘governance’ do provide us a sort of 
criterion to understand Chinese public administration, 
and changes of Chinese central governmental 
institutions. 
They are (1) the fallacy of ruling perlocution out of 
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the meaning of an utterance and out of the scope of 
pragmatics in general, (2) the dismissal of the role 
that the structure of locutions plays in the success of 
perlocutionary acts, (3) the fallacy of considering 
perlocutionary acts to be simple consequences of 
locutionary acts, (4) the fallacy of attaching little or 
no importance to the role of the speaker in the 
perlocutionary act, (5)  the fallacy of attaching little 
or no importance to the role of the hearer in the 
perlocutionary act, (6)the fallacy of taking no 
consideration of the actually achieved effects in a 
hearer. 
Traditional Chinese public administration  
--- Governance by hierarchy (complete control) 
In the sense of economism, determinism, materialism 
and structuralism in classical Marxism, Marx thought 
that the mode of production of material life 
determines consciousness and the economic ‘basis’ 
determines the ‘superstructure’. (Marsh and Stoker, 
2002,2st, p154) and, historically, the traditional 
Chinese economy ‘basis’ was rooted in small-scale 
peasant agriculture; productive materials and power 
were controlled by the minority--- feudalists. 
Consequently, the foundation of the traditional 
Chinese political order was the national bureaucracy, 
with its origins in the Han dynasty, and with a history 
of nearly 2,000 years. (Harry, 1987,p24) with its 
profound influence, the structure of traditional 
administration is typically hierarchy, and operates by 
setting and enforcing top-down policies, rules and 
regulations, and is characterized by: unitary 
organization, shared norms and values, perfect 
obedience, full information and all the time needed to 
do the job properly. (Larmour, 1997,p2) Since the 
establishment of Chinese new polity in 1949, 
highly-centralized government, emulated largely from 
soviet-style system, master and control almost 
everything, for its mistrust and suspicion of the 
private sector and enterprise. Even though some 
economic achievements have been reached, such as, 
revival of steel industry, highly-centralized form still 
straight contributes to the lag ten years to twenty 
years of plenty of spheres behind world levels overall, 
such as, technology. (Harry, 1987,p33). By the time 
of Mao’s death, china’s bureaucratic structure was ill 
qualified to administer a programme of sustained 
economic modernization. Especially during the 
period between 1966 and 1976 (cultural revolution), a 
severe crisis of Chinese government is produced and 
its legitimacy was challenged greatly. Hence, the 
pressure and necessities for reform are inevitable and 
will be a ‘good medicine’ to get China out of crisis. 
Modern Chinese public administration 
(post-Mao’s period) 
---The transforming governance 
P In Chinese politics, 1970s, reformers realized 
clearly that highly centralized model, to some extent, 
have impeded the development of Chinese economy 
and the improvement of living standard of people, 
and they proposed to restructure and revise the 
institutions in Mao’s presidency. However, everything 
is never possible to break with the past heritage 
completely. Although innovators were in favor of 
professionalization of policy-making and 
administration, as well as permitting the existence, 
and exercising the role of market, they also believed 
that CCP (Chinese communist party) should retain 
ultimate leadership. In this special context, Chinese 
society was experiencing a period of rapid 
socio-economic changes; transformations of the 
design and functions of china’s administrative 
institutions, decentralization, devolution, 
human-oriented management and cooperation 
between government and market, civil society, and 
government have emerged, called “market socialist 
economy’’. And the Chinese government has taken 
major steps to open up domestic markets and promote 
the development of commerce. During this period, 
‘governance’ of Chinese government is transforming 
from ‘complete control of hierarchy’ to ‘flexible 
forms of governance’. 
Institutional Reform: 
According to Hongxia Chai, There have been four 
main institutional reforms in China’s ‘Reform and 
Open Door’ policy since 1978. 
The 1982 Institutional Reforms 
The 1982 institutional reforms: in December 1981, in 
the process of downsizing the state bureaucracy, the 
total number of ministries or agencies directly under 
the control of the State Council was cut from 100 to 
61, with regard to staff, State Councils were reduced 
from 51,000 to 30,000. 
The 1988 Reform of the State Council 
This new initiative focused on transforming 
administrative functions with a particular emphasis 
on the redesign of departments of economic 
management. The plan’s long-term objective was to 
establish an administrative system that integrated the 
qualities of modern management with traditional 
characteristics of Chinese administration. In 
short-term goal was to balance relationship, transform 
functions, streamline staff, improve efficiency, 
overcome bureaucratization and increase the vitality 
and flexibility of central state organizations. 
The 1993 Institutional Reforms  
This phase of institutional reform focused on 
establishing an administrative system, which would 
underpin the socialist-oriented market economy. And 
the process of decentralization allowed for a process 
of ‘hollowing-out’ to occur at the centre. 
The 1998 Institutional Reforms 
Significant improvements have been made during this 
period with regard to separating administration from 
 40
X. Song 
enterprise management, through the successful 
privatization of state-owned enterprises, and 
improving public management and the style of 
service delivery. (Chai, 2004) 
 It is considerably obvious from above that the 
content of the reforms in china varies with time and 
place, but its principles span several models of 
‘governance’. Such as, New Public Management, 
Networks and so forth. In the process of 
‘marketization’, the first step for Chinese government 
is that more state-owned factories have been 
privatized, some being sold to domestic investors, and 
others to foreigners. Following the Western model, 
and sometimes with the help of foreign brokerage 
houses, increasing numbers of companies are being 
listed on domestic or foreign stock exchanges. (Jean 
and Thomas) As a consequence, those enterprises, 
which have been marketized successfully from 
state-owned industries, are undertaking the pillars and 
core of market economic systems. The purpose of this 
action is to make the most of ‘ market machine’ to 
distribute resources efficiently and flexibly, disclosure 
and openness of information, and a clearly allocated 
accountability, combined with ‘steering’, ‘goal 
setting’ and ‘action coherence’ from government. 
Even though the Chinese government has met some 
troubles and obstacles, at least it is seeking 
opportunities to incorporate ‘privatization’, which is a 
branch of ‘market mechanism’, to the Chinese 
government innovations. Certainly, it is not just 
saying that ‘privatization’ is always a good thing. It is 
merely applied as an auxiliary means to enhance the 
capabilities of Chinese public administration. . 
Decentralizations: 
Decentralization is one of the most important 
principles in the governance as Networks. It means 
‘hollowing-out of the state’ and pools power of 
central government to local government by 
international interdependencies and multiplying 
internal networks. 
Before the term of reformists, the relationship 
between central government and local government 
was experiencing the vicious cycles of Centralization, 
Decentralization, and Recentralization. In the 1950s 
and 1960s, the CCP (Chinese Communist Party)’s 
failed decentralization mainly decentralized power 
from Central Ministries to provincial Party 
Committees; therefore power was still concentrated in 
the hands of the government. (Zheng, 1997,p99) In 
January 1961, the Ninth Plenum of the Eighth Central 
Committee discussed the administrative system and 
concluded that too much power had been transferred 
to the localities; a new round of centralization was 
initiated.  
In the process of State-building under a Reformist 
Party, The CCP’s decentralization policies can be 
broadly grouped as fiscal and administrative. Fiscal 
decentralization began in 1980, which permitted each 
provincial government and to retain profits above the 
contracted amount for local purposes. Known as 
‘eating in separate kitchens’ this fiscal reform was 
aimed at making provinces financially self-sufficient. 
(Zheng, 1997,p216) Provinces especially for the 
coastal regions have particularly benefited from this 
administrative reform, for example, four Special 
Economic Zones were set up in Guangdong and 
FuJian provinces, which have enjoyed customs 
exemptions and preferential policy treatment to 
attract foreign capital. (Zheng, 1997,p216) afterwards 
even the central government tends to recentralize 
again, however provincial government officials 
insisted that further decentralization would lead to 
more reforms. Even through decentralization, local 
government have had more autonomy than ever 
before, the leaders in Beijing often resorted to the last 
organizational tool that the Party centre still has, 
namely, the centrally controlled nomenclature system, 
especially by reshuffling provincial leaders. (Zheng, 
1997, p220) anyway in Deng’s regime, when China’s 
social, economic and international environment has 
been changing so dramatically, a new framework was 
designed for balancing the needs for central control 
an local autonomy, such as, greater authority in 
investment and resource-allocation decisions.  
The consequences of decentralization are fairly 
apparent; politically Deng’s regime won supports due 
to people’s improvement of living standard, 
economically for the past sixteen years from 1988, 
there was a national sustained an average growth rate 
of 9 percent and great boost of the local economy. But 
during the process of this new 
reform-‘decentralization’, there were still some bad 
points that are needed to be addressed here. In the 
first place, it is weakening macroeconomic control. 
Decentralization indeed created some incentives to 
accelerate local industrial growth, but sometimes 
ignoring warnings and guidance from the central 
government. Secondly, it is the rising local 
protectionism. By virtue of the fragile local market, 
local governments would intend to take protective 
steps for the competitions imposed by other local 
administrative areas. 
Even though there are plenty of defects of reforms on 
decentralization from 1980s to now, the achievements 
it attained could illuminate the effects brought by the 
transition of ‘governance with Chinese characteristic’. 
From the phenomena mentioned above, we can use 
the conceptions of governance as networks to make 
sense of the changing and transformation, or tendency 
of Chinese public administration. 
The continued importance of the state and 
hierarchy in current Chinese situation 
In the literatures of ‘governance’, the emphasis on 
networks, New Public Management etc is becoming 
very popular; it tends to ignore the continued 
importance of hierarchy. For example, if interactions 
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within the network become more frequent than 
interaction with the mother-organization, hierarchical 
accountability may suffer. (Kjaer, 2004,p203) 
therefore, when benefactors from a policy are highly 
concentrated, interests may be skewed in one 
direction, with the result that a network could be 
dominated by these interests. Hierarchy would be 
needed to ensure that the outcome was in the interest 
of the majority. 
Profoundly influenced by Chinese long-term 
hierarchical structure of the state, new regime of 
China certainly cannot break the tie with the history 
easily either politically or culturally. Secondly, in the 
context of globalization, in order to alleviate the 
pressure from the global economy and 
commercialization, it should strengthen a state rather 
than hollowing out of the state. Thirdly, according to 
the law ‘supply and demand’, sometimes the state 
would suffer from ‘market failure’, which probably 
result in the devastation of the entirely economic 
development and bring the state into ‘economic 
crisis’. Finally, for developing countries, because of 
the fragile competitive capabilities with developed 
countries, the state should use its power to control 
and protect the weak fields, say, agricultural field.  
In agricultural commerce of China, it also has opened 
the way for extensive change in the rural economy, 
under the establishment of institutions and 
infrastructure necessary for continued commercial 
development. (Terry, 1995, p37) with the coming of 
‘marketization’, agriculture is also forced into ‘open 
market’ to accept the challenge from other 
competitors, the price of ‘agricultural procurement’ 
and ‘retail sales’ are all determined by market, instead 
of ‘planned price’, in the meantime, the quota of 
produces is not enforced and compulsory. In the food 
sector, government planning has given way to 
markets and private enterprises intent on satisfying 
increasingly discerning and sophisticated tastes of 
Chinese citizens. However, because Chinese 
agricultural is based on small-scale and 
labor-intensive production, so compared with 
high-tech and large-scale agricultural productions in 
developed countries, protection and control from 
Chinese government is necessary and in the interest 
of farmers. In domestic market, governmental control 
also played considerably key actor in maintaining 
equality of competition, and provision of 
transportation, storage of products, tools of 
communication, and prevention of monopoly and 
control of price. To further understanding of 
continued significance of the government, I will take 
the case of SARS as another example, from the year 
of 2003 to 2004; SARS hit many countries all over 
the world. Especially in china, with the guidance and 
organization of government, all kinds of institutions, 
such as hospitals, cooperated closely and had a quick 
response to this disease. It demonstrates the high 
efficiency and effectiveness of government, which 
overtakes the advantages of ‘mechanism of market’ in 
this situation. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
Ideas about ‘governance’ come from a widely range 
of theoretical traditions, and are not necessarily 
consistent with each other. (Larmour, 1998, p5). 
Anyone who tries to come up with a definition is like 
the blind men who tried to describe an elephant—one 
feeling the tail and calling it a snake, one feeling the 
leg and calling it a tree, one feeling the side and 
calling it a wall. (Robert and Minow, 2003,p8) 
similarly, some scholars consider ‘governance’ as 
‘self-organizing and inter-organizational networks 
‘ that more stress the role of ‘networks’; some argues 
that ‘governance’ should be as ‘the new public 
management’, others think that ‘governance’ still 
should be ‘governance with hierarchies’. In Chinese 
case, no any single model can be applied to the 
current Chinese situation straight. And in this 
background, the model of governance, which 
demonstrates the transformation of Chinese public 
administration, is a hybrid of several models blending 
and absorbing some factors from others. There is no 
doubt that ‘conceptions of governance’ have added to 
our understanding to Chinese public administration. 
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